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Glossary
abiana irrigation water charge
chak an outlet command area
Lambadar a person, representing landowners, appointed by the Revenue Department at the
village level to collect state revenues (including abiana) and to perform other
administrative duties.
Lambardari institution of the Lambadars
mistry mechanic
moga outlet
patwari Revenue Department official responsible for keeping land records and
assessing abiana




1 acre = 0.4047 hectare
PRs Pakistan rupee: US$1.00 = PRs 55.00.
InRs India rupee: US$1.00 = InRs 43.00v
Abstract
These notes present the impressions gathered by a team of Indian and Pakistani economists on
contemporary issues in irrigation management in these two countries. The authors suggest that the two
countries can learn important lessons by comparing notes on several issues: [a] what would work best
in ensuring equitable access to irrigation—physical rehabilitation being tried out in Pakistan Punjab
with the help of the army under the military rule offers interesting possibilities in terms of scale and
impact as does the  Andhra Pradesh model of irrigation reform, [b] the experience in both countries so
far defies the uncritically accepted premise that under farmer-management, irrigation systems will be
more equitable, [c] why farmers in Pakistan Punjab have to use 16-20 horsepower (hp) diesel engines
to pump groundwater from 25-40 feet while north Indian farmers have been doing the same with 5 hp
engines—if it is because of compulsion of habit, appropriate policies can save Pakistan substantial
diesel fuel per year, [d] India needs to ask why diesel engines in Lahore cost only 40-50 percent of the
retail price they command in Lucknow or Ludhiana—we suggest allowing free imports of Chinese
pumps will do away with the need for pump subsidies that keep diesel engines over-priced in India,
[e] both Pakistan and India need to pay serious attention to promoting simple pump modifications that
can increase fuel efficiency of their pumps by 40-70 percent, [f] India and Pakistan need to compare
notes on their rich experience of electricity pricing policies to achieve viability of electricity supply to
farmers and to achieve important goals of groundwater management and policy.
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Irrigation Management in Pakistan and India:
Comparing Notes on Institutions and Policies
Tushaar Shah, Intizar Hussain, and Saeed ur Rehman
Introduction
These notes are based on fieldwork undertaken by a team of Pakistani and Indian researchers of the
International Water Management Institute (IWMI) exploring the water productivity variations in
irrigated agriculture in these two countries of the subcontinent. Pakistan and north India share a great
deal in terms of their socio-ecology, history and culture. Yet, there are notable variations in the
manner in which irrigation institutions and policies have evolved in the two countries. Comparative
analysis of the irrigation management institutions and policies of these countries throws up interesting
questions. This paper outlines five areas of policy relevance that promise a useful opportunity for
comparative institutional analysis and policy research in the water resources sector of India and
Pakistan.
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT)
Indian discussion on irrigation reform is abuzz with Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu
Naidu’s statewide program of transferring management of surface irrigation systems to Water User
Associations (WUAs). The scale and speed with which these changes have been implemented have
attracted worldwide attention. Assessments of the program—laudatory as well as critical—are already
available. But it will be some time before we will know whether the WUAs will sustainably carry out
operation and maintenance (O&M) activities and what will be the ultimate effects of the reform on
irrigation productivity, equity of access, and irrigation cost recovery.
The Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) of Pakistan recently announced a large
irrigation reform program in the Lower Chenab Canal (LCC), and some pioneering experimental work
done by IWMI in organizing water users in Hakra-4R distributary  in Harunabad district of Pakistan
Punjab has provided useful inputs in the conceptualization of the IMT program of LCC. In Hakra-4R,
a farmer organization (FO) was set up with facilitation from IWMI back in 1997; but it took 3 years of
long protracted negotiations with the Irrigation Department for the “turn over” to take place. As it
happens, the actual “turn over” amounts to considerably less than what farmers had expected, and the
relationship between the newly created PIDA and the FO is yet to mature. Even so, when we met
them, the FO Board members were upbeat about the prospects. To understand the dynamics of
irrigation management transfer (IMT) in Pakistan, we carried out some fieldwork in Hakra-4R in July
2000.2
Hakra-4R, on the Indus system, has over 48,000 acres in its command, 123 outlets, and 4,690
farmers (Bandaragoda et al. 1997). In the 3-tier federated FO facilitated by IWMI, each outlet had an
elected committee with 3-7 members and a chair. These were federated into 5 subsystem water user
organizations (WUOs). Five members from each subsystem went to a system-level Water Users
Federation (WUF), which has a five-member executive committee, one of them elected as the WUF
president. Under the new Water Law, PIDA has created a new structure with Water Course
Representatives at the outlet level and a 9-member system-level Executive Committee, with a
president. The IWMI-facilitated organization has now collapsed into the PIDA-mandated FO design
and this underwent irrigation management transfer (IMT) in April 2000.
PIDA has now announced a much larger IMT program for the Lower Chenab Canal (East)
covering a huge area in 4 districts, somewhat similar to the program in Andhra Pradesh. An Area
Water Board is constituted for the entire command and distributary-level organizations—such as that
we find today in Hakra-4R—are proposed. Lessons learned from Hakra-4R can be immensely useful
in designing and implementing new larger institutional reforms.
The “organizing protocol” that IWMI evolved in creating the Hakra-4R FO and the model created
by the Institute of Resource Development and Social Management (IRDAS) in Andhra Pradesh are
exemplars. Both involved a graduated, stage-wise process in which the idea of farmer management
was first introduced; local opinion leaders were co-opted, credible “champions” were sought out and
invited to lead the process of organizing, norms were evolved, and finally a structure was erected
(Bandaragoda et al. 1997). The approach in creating the models in both the cases was thus “process
and time intensive” but it promoted dialogue and therefore resulted in a FO with strong grassroots
linkages. Following the successful model, Andhra Pradesh swiftly enacted a law and created over
10,000 WUAs in the state over a short period of one year. PIDA is about to do the same. Working on
a much larger area, PIDA may be under pressure to move fast and cut corners with the “process.” This
may compromise the results of the intervention. There seems to be a role here for IWMI in
conceptualizing its “organizing protocol,” refining it and engaging with PIDA in upscaling it.
Another aspect of study is the organization design of the FO. The IWMI-facilitated design at
Hakra-4R was bottom-heavy, unwieldy and slow, but it ensured broad-based participation by all
farmers and communication across the membership. The PIDA-mandated structure is leaner, faster
and cheaper but may run the high risk of ending up as an “oligarchy” of Zamindaars (big landholders)
who may run the distributary as a private fiefdom.
1 Moreover, without large-scale allegiance and
support of a majority of farmers, the leadership of such an oligarchic FO may not be able to do much
of significance. Even in the more participatory IWMI design at Hakra-4R, the governance of the FO
                                                                
1This danger is greater in Pakistan than in Andhra Pradesh because of the greater inequality of landholdings in the
former. Even the IWMI-created FO had a strong oligarchic propensity. The average landholding in Hakra-4R is less
than 10 acres, but the Social Organization Volunteers, the initial mobilizers used for organizing the FO at the water
course outlets, had holdings averaging 35 acres (Bandaragoda et al. 1997:34). The average landholding increased
systematically as one moved up the hierarchy of the FO: the average for water course level nominees was 58.7 acres;
for the Water User Federation members, it was 72.4 acres; and for WUF office bearers, it was 71.1 acres (ibid: 63), the
average for all 100 leaders surveyed being 58.7 acres. Less than 10 percent of the 125 FO leaders had landholdings
comparable to the population average of 9.2 acres (ibid: table 13, p 64).3
seemed heavily tilted towards large landowners and frustration with “domination by the bigwig”
emerged repeatedly as an important theme in our interviews with tail-enders and small farmers. In our
judgement, even if oligarchic, the governance structure of an FO may deliver better with strong
member control ensured by the IWMI design than with little or no member control as is likely under
the PIDA design. This transition from high member control to low member control seems evident in
Hakra-4R itself. For example, under the IWMI design, the FO Board was able to organize a massive
participatory maintenance campaign involving all members. But it is doubtful if it would be able to do
so under the PIDA design, which, in effect, recognizes in its formal working only 124 of the several
thousand irrigators in the distributary command.
Member willingness to support a FO is generally contingent upon the degree of control they
perceive they can exercise over it when necessary. In Hakra-4R, the Executive Committee and the
President of the FO have demonstrated a high level of enthusiasm and drive, but the primary
membership has not displayed the same level of enthusiasm. As a result, there is no resource
generation even to pay normal management costs, and the FO Board members have had to meet the
substantial transaction costs of leadership roles from their personal resources. This has also meant that
only resourceful members gravitate into leadership positions. Now, even these resourceful Board
members are feeling restless and wonder how long they can continue to bear the transaction costs of
leadership roles and are exploring ways of recouping their investments.
2
A critical issue on which greater clarity is needed is the value-adding role the WUAs are to
assume. According to the Hakra-4R FO Board, the main benefit of the FO is the elimination of rent-
seeking, estimated at PRs 2,500,000-2,800,000
3 per year for the distributary as a whole. This amounts
to about PRs 1,500-1,800 per hectare, over 7-9 times the abiana (irrigation water charge) assessment,
which seems a great deal but is not implausible. Fragmented trade in canal irrigation turns at the tail
end, at PRs 2,000 per hour for 45 weeks in a year and PRs 150-200 per hour for a single turn, indicate
the high value assigned to canal irrigation at the tail end. The Vice-President of the Hakra-4R FO
auctioned a 2-hour turn assigned to his village for the entire year at PRs 10,000 last year, and at PRs
17,000 in the current year. These suggest the high economic value of canal irrigation in Punjab. It can
mean either of two things: a smart FO can generate considerable resources for development through
sound management of canal water supplies; or the FO can replace the existing spoils system by a new
one. That the second is more likely to happen is indicated in five items on the immediate agenda of the
Hakra-4R FO Board after the IMT occurred: a) Lobbying for flat rate for abiana; b) Replacing
Lambardars by Water Course Representatives in abiana collection (we discuss this further below); c)
Entrusting to  patwaris of the FO the task of abiana assessment; d) Ensuring that Water Course
Representatives get 5 percent of the total collection per water course as commission, provided abiana
                                                                
2One solution the Hakra-4R Board has found is to replace the traditional Lambardars by Outlet Representatives in the
role of  abiana (irrigation water charge) collection for which they get a commission of 5 percent of the total collection.
The Board believes that this might be one way of compensating the 124 FO leaders for the transaction costs they have
to incur in their leadership roles. Several new activities proposed—such as fertilizer and agrochemical supply—are to
be undertaken, not as FO services to members but as income generating activities for leaders.
3US$1.00 =PRs 55.00.4
collection is 100 percent; and e) Starting fertilizer distribution and other agro-services by getting
dealerships for FO Board members or other members. Thus some of the issues being raised about IMT
in Andhra Pradesh—about rent-seeking by members of ruling political party, apathy of WUA
members, control by local elite—are all likely to play themselves out as Pakistan’s IMT story unfolds.
The Institution of Lambardari
In India, Sri Lanka, and many other countries around the world, the inability of government to ensure
irrigation cost recovery is the most important problem IMT is designed to solve. In Sri Lanka, the
canal water charge is zero. In India, the assessed water fee is a small proportion of the cost of O&M
and what is collected is often less than 20-30 percent of that assessed.
4 In Pakistan, the situation on
this front is different and better; according to information provided by some experts at IWMI-
Pakistan, the total assessment for canal irrigation for Punjab in 1999 was PRs 1.72 billion and the total
fee collection was PRs 1.25 billion or 72 percent of the assessment. The present government has
stipulated that irrigation charges per acre will increase at a rate of 10 percent per year, compounded;
which means that the total collection might cover O&M costs in 5-7 years, especially with the current
ban on recruitment of new staff in PIDA—with staff costs being over 80 percent of O&M costs. Thus
the financial burden of O&M in Pakistan’s surface systems does not seem to be as unresolvable an
issue as in other South Asian countries.
Moreover, Pakistan Punjab has what no other South Asian country has: a well-established
institution of Lambardari. Lambardari existed mainly in Punjab and NWFP (North West Frontier
Province), but was never adopted in Sindh. A Lambardar is an unofficial link between the landowners
in his village and the government officials. He represents landowners and not the government. While
he is appointed by the Revenue Department (Revenue Collector), he does not hold any formal office
in Pakistan government services.
5 Hereditary claim, good family background and ownership of land
                                                                
4Bhatia, Rogers and de Silva (1999), for instance, estimated that in India “a farmer pays (for surface irrigation) US$3.3
per hectare (ha) as irrigation charges against an estimated expense of US$26 per ha of water supply. This resulted in a
total subsidy of US$800 million during 1993-94.” Similarly, B N Navalawala (1999), Irrigation Advisor to India’s
Planning Commission, lamented: “In 1945-46, just before Independence, profit from irrigation schemes was Rs 7.92
crores on an investment of Rs 149 crore, i.e., 5.30%. [But] financial losses [in government-managed irrigation schemes
were] Rs 4,246 crore in 1995-96” [p.6]. A committee appointed by the Government of India in 1992 to examine
irrigation pricing estimated total losses (including interest on investment) in the surface irrigation sector to be InRs
20,286 crore during the 8
th Five Year Plan period. According to India’s Central Water Commission, during 1991-92,
gross receipt of irrigation charges per hectare was InRs 82 and working expenses of irrigation systems was InRs 1,032.
Irrigation fees have not been revised in most states in 20 years. According to Navalawala, some InRs 1,000 crore of
assessed fees remain uncollected; in Assam, collection is less than 1 percent of O&M costs; in Bihar, collection is 25
percent of assessment; and in Uttar Pradesh, it is 40 percent.
5However, the appointment procedures, duties and powers of the Lambardar are well defined in the Land Revenue Act
1967 and Land Revenue Rules 1968. Under Section 47 of the Canal and Drainage Act (Act VIII of 1873), a Lambardar5
within the same village are important considerations for appointment as a Lambardar. According to
Land Revenue Rules, the principal duties of a Lambardar include: [a] Collection of all land revenue
recoverable from landowners within his village and payment of the same into treasury, and
acknowledgement of any payment received by him in the books of the landowner and tenant; [b]
Assisting all officers of the government in execution of their public duties within the village, assisting
in functions such as crop inspections or surveys carried out in his village, and supplying the required
information and generally acting for and on behalf of the landowners, tenants and residents of the
village.
In the context of irrigation, the Lambardar is specifically responsible for: [a] Collecting and
paying into the treasury irrigation water charges from farmers in his village; [b] Helping the patwari
to register or correct irrigation records; [c] Reporting to and helping irrigation staff and revenue
department staff investigating cases of water theft, and breaks and cuts in canals. For performing these
services, the Lumbardar is provided 12.5 acres of land and receives 5 percent of the assessed abiana as
remuneration. Lambardars are subject to a penalty if they fall short of a certain threshold level of
collection. Every village has one or more Lambardars, and on a 5 percent commission, this steelframe
of Pakistan Punjab’s abiana collection system is also a low-cost mechanism for abiana collection. In
many Indian irrigation systems, the cost of water fee collection exceeds the revenue collected. The
institution of Lambardars ensures that the abiana collection performance in Pakistan is better than that
in many other countries in the region. If improvement is required, it would probably be at the
assessment stage. Here comes the IWMI case for a flat rate for irrigation charges, which eliminates the
power of the patwaris.
6
We received conflicting messages about the social role of Lumbardars. One viewpoint was that
they are influential local leaders, are widely respected and often serve as change agents and opinion
leaders but are generally not very large landowners. Another vi ewpoint was that they are trouble-
                                                                                                                                                                                                
is employed to collect state revenue and to perform other administrative duties under the Act. The government places
serious reliance on any information or certificate given by the Lambardar.
6After an in-depth study and extensive debate, IWMI’s Pakistan office has recently recommended to the Government of
Pakistan that instead of crop-based canal irrigation charges, it would be better, cheaper and administratively easier to
set a flat abaina per hectare of land commanded. In fact, a flat rate was recommended a century ago by some official of
the Colonial Government, and then Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto took up the suggestion and implemented a flat
irrigation tariff in Sindh. However, this was withdrawn a few years later; it is not clear why. One viewpoint is that it
was not convenient for the powerful landed gentry who could manipulate the crop-based water fees to their advantage.
But it would be useful to understand the experience gained and why that policy was abandoned. Another aspect worth
exploring is why the warametric water charging experiment that was piloted in Haryana in the 1970s and which offered
great promise did not enter IWMI’s recent debate on abiana. From what little we understood, the warametric method of
irrigation charge collection has all the advantages of the flat rate but still creates some incentives for water productivity.
Basically, warametric pricing involves putting a price per hour of a wari which is fixed for all farmers on an outlet, and
weighing it by the size of the inflow to the outlet. This might show promise if, under the institutional reforms in
progress, abiana assessment and collection is to be decentralized to distributary level FOs.6
making exploiters who, with the patwaris as cohorts, mess around with the abiana assessment. The
reality is obviously somewhere in the middle but nobody we talked to questioned their effectiveness in
collecting the assessed abiana and, in some ways, this is no mean achievement, considering the
widespread failure of government machinery to perform this task effectively in other countries of the
region. Overall then, even if not ideal, Lambardari may well be a useful institution; many countries
that are thinking of outright privatization of irrigation systems might eventually evolve similar or
worse institutional arrangements.
One problem that Pakistan Punjab faces in its IMT program—that Andhra Pradesh in India does
not face—is that, as conceived now, it may well do away with the Lambardars, or vice versa. The new
Lower Chenab Canal initiative proposes that the task of abiana collection as well as the 5 percent
commission may be handed over to the Water Course Committees—which, if implemented will seal
the fate of the Lambardars. In Hakra-4R, the Board wants Lambardars replaced by the 124 Water
Course Representatives. They want the abiana to be collected by Water Course Representatives and
the commission paid to them. This may amount to replacing one class of agents by another. But before
all this can happen, it is very likely that the influential and elite class of Lambardars will probably try
their best to frustrate the IMT initiative.
Moga Modification Program
A major issue in the Indus system—as in most South Asian systems—is that of equity in access to
irrigation, especially, inequity that causes the tail-enders’ woes. Without much evidence in support,
the irrigation management literature implicitly assumes that this, and many other problems of canal
irrigation, will get resolved with IMT, which has almost assumed the stature of a gospel. Pakistan has
witnessed a refreshingly new response to the problem of inequity in canal irrigation access. Soon after
military rule was established, the government took an unusual decision to clean up and rehabilitate the
canal system, distributary downward, with the help of the army. This involved a massive effort in
cleaning and desilting and, most crucially, rebuilding the outlets (mogas) to deliver their originally
designed discharge. Nearly half of the distributaries in Punjab has been “rehabilitated” thus; the rest
will be taken up next year. The moga modification program hit the nail on its head! Head-tail inequity
in the Indus system—as in all South Asian canal irrigation systems—is caused largely by gradual
enlargement of the outlets by farmers at the head and middle reaches. The impact of this physical
intervention has been dramatic and far reaching because it has upset the long-established “seating
arrangement on the deck.” For the first time in many years, large areas in the tail ends of the system
have been brought under irrigation. If a group of farmers we interviewed are to be believed, in Hakra-
6, 15-20 murabbas (1 murabba = 25 acres), and in Hakra-7, some 22-25 murabbas of new land got
irrigation at the tail. In Hakra-4R itself, some 500 acres in the tail got irrigation for the first time. One
Board member of Hakra-4R FO lamented: “After the Military’s moga modification program, the
Hakra-4R distributary, which is designed to carry 300-325 cusecs of water, developed an over-grown
tail carrying 150 cusecs of water!” Naturally farmers at the tail are uniformly and supremely happy
and those in the middle and head are uniformly and extremely unhappy. The severity of the sting7
seems to be proof of the significance of the impact of redistribution of the moga modification
program.
8 Farmers at the head lamented that the head-tail inequity is not reduced but reversed.
In many other South Asian countries, farmers would probably have frustrated such an intervention
by razing the modified outlets even before the cement dried;
9 in Pakistan, farmers in the head and
middle fumed and blew hot and cold but attempts to change the modified mogas appear few and far
between, except those made with the connivance of the local bureaucracy. It is not clear why. Possible
reasons are the tight administration by the present government, the prohibitively high penalty attached
to tinkering with public property, and the fact that, since half or more canal irrigators have holdings of
25 acres or more, most mogas can be identified with specific farmers and this reduces the monitoring
costs greatly. In many Indian systems, an outlet serving a chak (an outlet command area) may serve up
to 50 farmers and so it is difficult to find the culprit; but in Pakistan, it may be easier. But the most
important reason might be strong peer pressure because of a reasonably well-functioning warabandi
system.
How would farmer organizations react in such situations? In Hakra-4R, head- and middle-reach
farmers raised an uproar because the army intervention apparently reduced their water share far less
than their original entitlement, and this became the major drive for creating the FO. To redress this
grievance, PIDA re-modified the mogas redistributing water from head to tail. Even this did not seem
to satisfy the farmers; so the first thing the FO did after the distributary was ‘turned over’ was to carry
out one more round of  moga modification, very nearly restoring the original, long-established seating
arrangement on the deck!
Groundwater Economy of Punjab
Groundwater irrigation is extremely important in Punjab, Pakistan’s granary, and yet there is little
formal research in the way the groundwater economy functions. Around 80 percent of Punjab’s
farmlands are under the Indus system. Of Punjab’s total geographical area of 51 million acres, a little
over 40 million are under the Indus system and, of these, 31 million acres are under wheat (personal
communication with Mr. Bhatti of National Engineering Services of Pakistan [NESPAK, Lahore]).
Punjab also has 0.5 million of Pakistan’s 0.58 million tubewells; tubewells contribute more to
Punjab’s agriculture than is generally imagined. According to Mr. Bhatti, of the total surface water
supplies of 55 million acre feet released to Punjab, 30 end up at the farm gate, and the remaining 25
                                                                
8Another indirect evidence is the bribes many farmers paid to irrigation overseers to restore their mogas to their original
size. Farmers we interviewed suggested a rate of PRs 20,000 per moga for a bribe. In some distributaries, many farmers
got their mogas rehabilitated at this going rate. If this is true, then the welfare impact of the army intervention probably
got considerably reduced, and the canal engineer emerged as the primary beneficiary.
9In India’s Indira Gandhi canal in Rajasthan, for instance, farmers frustrated all efforts to introduce water measurement
devices at the outlet level that would serve some 80 smallholders. Tushaar Shah participated in a function to inaugurate
one such fancy structure in Bajju area of Bikaner district in December 1989. Next morning, it was found vandalized
and razed.8
disappear as either evaporation or seepage. Farmers supplement these canal supplies by 31 million
acre feet of groundwater irrigation pumped by 0.5 million tubewells (62 acre feet per tubewell per
year). To the society, groundwater irrigation is far cheaper compared to surface water irrigation.
According to the above source, Punjab’s surface system is worth US$150 billion in capital cost and all
its tubewells have cost of US$0.5 billion; yet, both deliver the same amount of water at the farm gate.
But what tubewells gain in capital cost, they lose in their operating cost. The annual operating cost of
the tubewell sector is US$8 billion whereas the O&M cost of the surface system is US$40 million.
Wheat, Punjab’s mainstay, is grown with an irrigation delta of 3 feet; of these, 1 foot is contributed by
surface irrigation, 1 foot by tubewells and 1 foot by rainfall. This calculus is likely to be representative
of the situation in much of canal-irrigated India.
A critical issue for groundwater irrigation in Pakistan is salinity. The big problem that the Salinity
Control and Reclamation Project (SCARP) was designed to address—waterlogging and salinity—is
still present today, unresolved and in some ways more serious, long after the original SCARP
program
11 ended. However, farmers in many areas have begun doing what the SCARP tubewells were
supposed to do. Under a new SCARP Transition Project, a subsidy of PRs 20,000 is provided on
capital cost to a group of farmers in the canal command to pump groundwater to augment the canal
water flows in the water course. These tubewells are commonly used for conjunctive use of surface
water and groundwater. During their canal irrigation turns, farmers pump the tubewell water into the
canal to augment supplies to their fields. In Sargodha district, we talked to farmers who use a cluster
of 5-10 strainers to capture the canal seepage from shallow depths and pump it to mix with canal
water for irrigating orchards. Farmers realize that they cannot pump for long periods at a time because
brackish water would bet pumped out after a long period.
Whether they merely skim canal seepage from a level close to the ground surface or pump
brackish groundwater from 25-30 feet, tubewells in Pakistan Punjab are mostly fitted with 16-20
horsepower (hp) diesel engines and delivery pipes of 5-inch diameter. These seem large considering
that pumping depths are barely 25-40 feet in Punjab. In north India, where farmers pump groundwater
from 25-40 feet, the most common diesel pump one comes across is of 5 hp, with a 4-inch delivery
pipe. The 16 hp pump uses 1.9-2.2 liter/hour of diesel as opposed to 0.9-1.1 liter/hour that the 5 hp
engine uses. Why does the Pakistani farmer need a 16 hp diesel engine to pump water from 30 feet
while the north Indian farmer has carried on jolly well with a 5 hp engine all these years? If the
Pakistani farmer does not really need the 16 hp engine, there might be important opportunities for
huge gains in fuel efficiency by reducing the size of the prime mover.
One plain explanation was in terms of comparative advantage: Pakistan’s diesel prices as well as
diesel engine prices today are lower in real terms than India’s. A 16 hp Chinese diesel pump at PRs
14,000 in Lahore is over 30 percent cheaper than a 5 hp Kirloskar in Lucknow at InRs 17,500
(US$1.00 = InRs 43.00 = PRs 55.00); similarly, at PRs 13.5 per liter, diesel is also 30 percent cheaper
in Pakistan than India’s price of InRs 15.6  per liter. No wonder then that the Pakistani farmer has a
                                                                
11This was a large program to set up public tubewells expressly to pump groundwater in waterlogged areas directly into
canals or field channels with the twin purpose of providing vertical drainage and augmenting canal flows to tail ends.
India too tried a similar strategy in the Satlaj-Yamuna canal.9
preference for diesel pumps, and big ones at that. The argument against this is that the Pakistani
farmer’s preference for 16 hp engines is 25-30 years old and it is unlikely that engine and diesel price
ratios between India and Pakistan have always been the way they are today.
Another common explanation we encountered was that of compulsion of habit. Until the Chinese
pumps arrived in Pakistan over 20 years ago, farmers in Pakistan Punjab were used to huge, unwieldy
black oil engines. Because of this ‘Big is Beautiful’ tradition, Pakistani farmers took to high-powered
Chinese engines; and once the trend started, the “Microsoft Windows” phenomenon probably began to
operate. Since a majority of farmers use 16-20 hp engines, new buyers too tended to gravitate to these
because they as well as mistrys (mechanics) were most familiar with them, spare parts are easily
available locally, and dealers stock these most. In general, the 16 hp engines became the industry
standard in Pakistan as much as the 5 hp became the standard in India. If this is true, then an
interesting research and policy issue is how to get Pakistani farmers to use more fuel-efficient
pumping plants just as India should explore how to get farmers in eastern India to start using 2 or 3 hp
engines rather than using 5 hp engines as their speed of pumping is tied down by lower than optimal
water levels. Between the two countries, this could mean savings of billions of liters of diesel per year.
Messers Gohar and Bhatti of NESPAK suggested that farmers need high discharge from their
tubewells because these are commonly used for conjunctive irrigation. Under the warabandi system,
the farmer gets less than half an hour per acre of canal irrigation a week. During this period, he wants
to mix as much groundwater as possible with canal water. This requires that his machine works during
the wari (irrigation turn) but also that it provides a high discharge. This makes sense. Mr. Gohar also
suggested that the farmer does not worry unduly about energy losses because after the first 2-3
minutes of operation, the 16 hp diesel engine any way settles down to an effective 6-7 hp output and
uses only that much fuel as it needs to do that much work. This means that although its rated capacity
is 16 hp, it in effect works as a 6-7 hp engine most of the time.
Yet another explanation offered was in terms of the differences in average landholding sizes. In
Pakistan Punjab, at 4.5 ha, the average holding size is significantly larger than in north India. So
although they pump from comparable depths, Pakistani farmers need higher discharge rate compared
to the Indian farmer. Moreover, Indian farmers using diesel pump irrigation invariably use flexible
rubber pipes for conveying water, which reduces seepage but also make it possible to convey water for
long distances. In Pakistan, pumped water is normally conveyed through irrigation canals or field
channels; these require sizeable discharge to provide for 30-40 percent conveyance losses and for
water to reach some distance.
To construct a quick test of our hypotheses, we surveyed 25 diesel pump owners in Sargodha
district of Pakistan Punjab and compared the results with a 1994 study of 40 diesel pump owners
carried out by IWMI (IIMI 1994). The results, presented in table 1, seem to reverse our hypotheses: it
suggests that the 5 hp diesel engines used in north India seem over-sized when compared to the large
engines in use in Pakistan Punjab. For a liter of diesel, the Pakistani tubewells seem to do more work
than the north Bihar ones. The former uses less than twice the diesel per hour used by the latter, but
lifts more than 2.5 times the discharge and that too over twice the head of the north Bihar pumps. It is
not surprising that Indian experiments on improving fuel efficiency of diesel pumps have found
reducing the RPM (resolutions per minute) to be an effective way of reducing fuel consumption
without sacrificing the discharge (Reidhead 1999).10
Table 1.
Comparison of diesel pumps in Pakistan and north India.
Pakistan North Bihar
Sample size 25 40
Average hp 17.3 5
Pipe diameter (inches) 5 4
Depth of the bore (feet) 115 66
Head range (feet) 33 16-24
Average fuel consumption (l/hr) 2.03 1.03
Discharge (l/s) 23 9.2
Note: All values in the table are averages of respective variables. Pakistan data are based on a survey carried out by
IWMI in July 2000. Indian data are from an IWMI study of groundwater use in north Bihar (IIMI 1994:60-66).
Electricity Pricing for Tubewells
Another exciting sequence of change in Pakistan’s irrigation is the experimentation that WAPDA
(Water and Power Development Authority) and NEPRA (National Electric Power Regulatory
Authority) have engaged in with electricity pricing for tubewells over the past decade. Because of
salinity problem, Pakistan needs to devise ways of providing spatially differentiated incentives or
disincentives for groundwater withdrawal in order to produce the same results that the famous SCARP
tubewell program was designed to do. So far, the government has been trying to provide such
incentives under the SCARP Transition Project through a capital cost subsidy on diesel pumps and
tubewells. But it can be argued that private electric tubewells offer a more powerful option; the
present program increases the density of diesel tubewells but can do little to stimulate total withdrawal
per tubewell. With electric pumps, it is possible to stimulate both the density as well as average
pumpage in areas where it is necessary to do so, as in parts of the Chaj Doab (region between Chenab
and Jhelum rivers) in Punjab.
The electricity pricing policy in Pakistan during the past decade, however, has been dictated
entirely by the economics and the logistics of power supply. Until 1991, Pakistan had metered
electricity tariff at around PRs 0.65 per unit. According to farmers and pump dealers we interviewed
in Lahore, a very large proportion of tubewells in Punjab—over 80 percent according to some, which
seems unlikely to be true—used electric motors as prime movers. Circa 1991, the Government of
Pakistan changed to flat tariff for much the same reason as many of the Indian states did during the
mid-1970s. Metering costs were high, pilferage of power was extensive, and farmers regularly
complained about the highhandedness and arbitrariness of WAPDA’s meter readers. Flat rate (FR)
was seen as a one-stroke answer to the problem of metering costs as well as of reducing the hassle.
Most Indian states changed to flat electricity tariff for similar reasons in the late 1970s, and witnessed
























































In Indian discussions on groundwater markets during the 1980s, it was argued that, besides being
simpler and cheaper to administer, flat power tariff is a powerful means of improving poor farmers’
access to groundwater irrigation (Chambers, Saxena and Shah 1987; Shah 1993). Much evidence was
presented to show that the switch from metered to flat power tariff resulted in immediate and
substantial decline in the prices of pump irrigation in informal water markets, expanded groundwater
trade, enhanced capacity utilization of tubewells, and stimulated irrigated farming by pumpless
smallholders who depend upon water markets for their irrigation needs. This analysis anticipated that
flat tariff calculated on the basis of prior average power consumption per tubewell would result in
losses because flat tariff would stimulate greater pumpage; but it argued that social benefits of flat
tariff would remain invariant with respect to the level of flat tariff, and therefore recommended
progressive increases in flat tariff to cover power supply costs. Flat power tariff, however, got
discredited in India because state governments used it to subsidize power, leading many state
Electricity Boards to bankruptcy; they also used it indiscriminately regardless of the groundwater
potential of different regions. Throughout eastern India, where flat electricity tariff can produce
massive welfare, their actual effect was nearly the opposite; it resulted in progressive de-electrification
of rural areas forcing farmers to switch to diesel pumps for irrigation on a massive scale.
Unlike the Indian states, however, Pakistan raised its flat tariff several times to reflect increasing
power consumption per tubewell under FR as shown in figure 1. As the FR increased, the incentive to
Figure 1.
Progressive increases in flat electricity tariff in Pakistan, 1993-2000.12
cheat WAPDA increased too. As a result, a new business of fitting electric motors with plates of
smaller than their actual rated capacity flourished. In any case, it was very difficult to get WAPDA to
approve a high load; so it became common to install 15 hp motors, when the sanctioned load was 6-7
kw, and stick a plate of 5 hp so that the FR is charged at 5 hp. As part of its irrigation reform agenda,
the military government imposed heavy penalties on those who cheated on their electricity bills in
industry as well as agriculture. Many farmers went behind bars and many more had to pay arrears on
electricity bills since 1991—which pushed some out of business. Most importantly, a massive process
of dieselization of tubewell irrigation started; farmers disconnected electric pumps on a large scale and
replaced them by diesel engines. In March 2000, the government introduced a “flat-cum-metered
tariff” all over again. Unlike in India, farmers were not given the option to choose either flat tariff or
metered tariff. Flat-cum-metered tariff is the only option and the rates are:
Tariff/month in Punjab and Sindh = 82*kw + {110.4[0.49+0.75+0.63]} kWh
And
Tariff/month in NWFP and Baluchistan = 72*kw + {110.4[0.34+0.75+0.63]} kWh
Where the first component of the variable charge is energy charges, the second is Fuel Adjustment
Surcharge and the third is additional surcharge, and the last is “hydel” (hydroelectricity) surcharge at
10.4 percent levied on the total variable charge.
Our discussions with pump dealers and mistrys in Lahore suggested that farmers have again
begun turning to the electric tubewells. This trend may get a further impetus if the government reduces
the variable charge further as is being suggested in some quarters. The recent surge in electricity
connections to tubewells is very likely restricted to farmers who already had connections earlier but
had disconnected them and changed to Petter engines.
12 This is because it is very costly to change
from diesel engine to electric motor in Pakistan since the farmer has to bear the capital cost of drawing
the cable from the line to the tubewell, which involves PRs 25,000 for a 25 kv transformer, PRs
10,000 per pole and additional charges for cable. In India, this cost is borne by State Electricity
Boards (SEBs), and it makes electric connections attractive. Be that as it may, as of today, over 90
percent of private tubewells in Pakistan Punjab use 16-20 hp diesel engines as the prime mover. And
the case is similar in much of eastern India. The policy of flat electricity tariff has resulted, in both
countries, in progressive dieselization of tubewell irrigation. WAPDA’s intent clearly is to woo
farmers back to electric tubewells. And in these efforts, some micro-economic analysis could usefully
supplement the present experimental approach being tried out.
During the 1960s, a major consideration under the pricing of electricity tubewells in India was to
maximize power use per tubewell. The Electricity Board, which invested heavily on drawing lines to
the wellhead and installing transformers was concerned that each electrified tubewell used enough
power for it to recover its fixed costs over 5-7 years. So, besides a fixed component as in the present
                                                                
12Diesel engines are commonly called “Petter engines” in Pakistan, probably after the famous brand name of a British
engine manufacturer of a bygone era.13
WAPDA formula, Indian SEBs charged for metered power use along 3-4 slabs at declining rates;
farmers using tubewells sparingly had to pay a penal pro-rata rate, but beyond a threshold level they
paid a significantly lower rate. This encouraged tubewell owners to offer irrigation to neighboring
farmers; and this is how water markets first started. In figure 2, this scheme is shown by the curved
function. Our hypothesis is that under the present WAPDA pricing scheme, tubewell owners will
charge higher prices and sell less pump irrigation than under the one implicit in figure 2 under the
curved function because the latter will induce tubewell owners into expanding the pumpage to claim
the low pro-rata tariff at high levels of power use.
The upshot of this discussion is that while in surface irrigation a growing consensus is that prices
do not matter, in tubewell irrigation, prices—of both pumps as well as fuel—matter a great deal.
Pakistan’s decade old experimentation with electricity prices and farmers’ response to it provides
strong evidence in support of two hypotheses that have been in currency in South Asian discussions:
Figure 2.
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Cost = 61.5 +2.065 hrs
Cost =a+bh
2-ch14
[a] levels of flat tariff strongly influence the population of electric tubewells; and [b] the levels of pro-
rata tariff strongly influence the average operating factor of electric tubewells. In the flat-cum-prorata
electricity pricing systems in use in Pakistan now, this means that, other things being equal, low fixed
component and high pro-rata component would encourage more electric tubewells but produce low
average operating factor.
13 Conversely, high fixed component and low pro-rata charge will discourage
electric tubewells but induce surviving electric tubewell owners to achieve a high “operating factor.”
The lesson we learn is that in India and Pakistan—two of the world’s largest groundwater using
countries—electricity pricing for irrigation certainly needs to ensure viability of the electricity
industry; but doing only that is sacrificing a potentially powerful toolkit of policy instruments for
promoting sustainable management of the groundwater resource.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper discussed an assortment of issues in irrigation management in India and Pakistan and
identified several areas of policy relevant to comparative research in the water resources sectors of the
two countries. India and Pakistan can learn important lessons by comparing their experiences in
irrigation management transfer, water charge collection, interventions to reduce head-tail inequities,
and electricity pricing for groundwater management. Against the generally unimpressive results of
irrigation management transfer programs in many parts of Asia, the Pakistan experiment of moga-
rehabilitation program offers an interesting contrast as an approach to improving head-tail inequity.
The institution of Lambardari in Pakistan Punjab may well explain Pakistan’s superior performance in
abiana collection. IMT programs as designed today pose a major threat to Lambardari; and it will be
interesting to watch whether IMT compromises Lambardari or it is the other way around. At the
conceptual level, it is interesting to ask whether periodic moga rehabilitation, tightly run warabandi,
and Lambardari together do not offer a superior institutional compact compared to IMT.
Equally interesting are issues in groundwater management. Our discussion on the Pakistani
farmers’ penchant for large diesel pumps compared to north Indian farmers’ preference for 5 hp
pumps remains inconclusive. However, we believe the issue to be important enough for both countries
to deserve further scrutiny. Moreover, in view of the preeminence of diesel pumps in the Indus as well
as the Ganga basins, ongoing experiments in improving fuel efficiency of diesel pumps are of great
significance to both countries. In improving poor people’s access to groundwater irrigation, India has
operated myriad schemes of diesel pump subsidy; however, comparative analysis of India and
Pakistan suggests that these subsidies have only inflated diesel engine and pump prices. Our
conclusion is that dismantling the subsidies and opening up the imports of Chinese pumps and engines
will drastically reduce Indian diesel engine and pump prices even below the present subsidized prices.
Finally, both India and Pakistan have experimented with electricity pricing for tubewells but neither
has yet found a formula that protects the viability of electricity supply and also helps sustainable
groundwater management. However, the fact that electricity prices pinch is the proof of its power to
influence the behavior of millions of pump users in the two countries. We commend a more reflective
approach to the ongoing experiments in electricity pricing.
                                                                
13Operating factor = number of hours of tubewell operation/8,640.15
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